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NON-TRANSPARENT PBM CASH FLOWS:
BALANCING MARKET FORCES UNDER A
RELUCTANT LEGISLATIVE REGIME
JOHN MCGUINNESS*
ABSTRACT
In recent years, Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) have
been subject to increasing regulation in efforts to protect consumers
from rising drug prices. Although regulation is needed to control
PBMs’ unique market position, the pharmaceutical industry continues to suffer at the expense of consumer choice. Legislation varies
between jurisdictions and fails to account for market realities.
Recent state proposals attempting to weaponize free market ideals
have either failed to obtain the requisite vote or are falsely accused of government overreach hiding behind the veil of marketbased propositions.
This Note will examine the PBM transaction and explain why
a regulatory regime aimed to restore consumer choice and industry transparency will produce optimal market conditions without
stifling competition.

JD Candidate 2020, William & Mary Law School; BS 2017, Christopher
Newport University. I wish to thank Amanda VanInwegen for her insightful
comments and unwavering support. I also wish to thank my family, specifically
Brendan, Jackie, and Rosemary, for their constant love, guidance, and encouragement throughout all my academic endeavors. Lastly, thank you to the
staff and editors of the William & Mary Business Law Review for their contributions in editing this Note for publication.
*

289

290 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:289
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 291
I. PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGER INDUSTRY ............................... 292
A. Industry Structure and Composition ................................ 292
B. PBM Profit Optimization .................................................. 293
C. Inefficient Bilateral Market Conditions ............................ 297
II. RELATED INDUSTRY CONCERNS .............................................. 298
A. Formulary Control ............................................................. 298
B. Undercutting Pharmacies: Mail-Order Production.......... 299
C. Judicial Challenges to Unfair Trading Practices............. 300
III. FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES ......................................... 303
A. Federal ............................................................................... 303
B. State ................................................................................... 309
IV. MARKET SOLUTIONS .............................................................. 313
A. Free-Market Myth and Private Industry Concerns........... 315
1. Artificial Monopolies, Innovative Drugs, and
“Off-Patent Drugs” ........................................................... 315
2. PCMA’s Market-Based Solution ..................................... 317
B. Transparent Markets and Contracting Tenants............... 318
C. Role of Pharmacists ........................................................... 320
V. CONTRACT AND MARKET MORALITY ........................................ 321
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 322

2019]

NON-TRANSPARENT PBM CASH FLOWS

291

INTRODUCTION
Attempting to benefit from economies of scale,1 the pharmaceutical industry took a good idea, pharmacy benefit managers
(PBMs), and turned it into a complex series of transactions at the
expense of market transparency and consumer choice. PBMs are
the middlemen of the prescription drug industry, contracted by
health plans, employers, and government entities to manage prescription drug programs on behalf of health plan beneficiaries.2
Specifically, PBMs are contracted to administer prescription drug
plans because they are vested with negotiating power to secure rebates and discounts from drug manufacturers.3 Under these bilateral market conditions, middlemen narrow the available sets of
buyers and sellers, which improves consumer welfare if the market
search is costly and inefficient.4 However, in the case of prescription
drugs, PBMs conceal information and raise consumer costs as a
consequence of the market’s “extensive ... contract negotiation,
cost-benefit analysis, corporate haggling, manufacturer rebates,
and the artful salesmanship of pharmacy benefit managers.”5
Although some scholars argue PBM deficiencies are systematic and therefore require direct regulation, this Note posits
significant federal initiatives will only dirty the already murky
water of the complex pharmaceutical market.6 These regulations
overlook market realities and fail to acknowledge that PBMs are
merely one cog in the wheel of the prescription drug industry.7
Accordingly, this Note examines the pharmacy benefit management industry, identifies unfair trading practices in concealment
Economy of scale, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2011).
Mark Meador, Squeezing the Middleman: Ending Underhanded Dealing in
the Pharmacy Benefit Management Industry Through Regulation, 20 ANNALS.
HEALTH L. 77, 77–78 (2011) (explaining PBMs role in “coordinat[ing] the sale
and reimbursement of prescription drugs between health insurance plan sponsors or employers, drug manufacturers, and local and national pharmacies”).
3 Regina Sharlow Johnson, PBMs: Ripe for Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 323, 328 (2002).
4 Abdullah Yavaü, Middlemen in Bilateral Search Markets, 12 J. OF LAB.
ECON. 406, 408 (1994).
5 Meador, supra note 2, at 77.
6 But see Meador, supra note 2, at 78; see also infra Part III.
7 Allison Dabbs Garrett & Robert Garis, Leveling the Playing Field in the
Pharmacy Benefit Management Industry, 42 VAL. U.L. REV. 33, 78 (2007).
1
2
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of information, and reevaluates the necessary levels of intervention in creating efficient market inputs and outputs, enabling
parties to arrive at an economically efficient solution.8 In conclusion, this Note will explain how restructured contract incentives
support both transactional efficiency and market morality.9
I.PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGER INDUSTRY
A.Industry Structure and Composition
According to the Office of Policy Planning, roughly 95 percent
of insured Americans have prescription drug coverage administered through a PBM.10 Specifically, three large PBMs control
approximately 80 percent of the PBM market, consisting of at
least 180 million lives in the United States.11 At its inception,
PBM transactions were arranged to “negotiat[e] discounts with
pharmacies and manufacturers, substitut[e] less expensive drug
alternatives ... and fill[ ] prescriptions for chronic conditions by
mail ....”12 Nevertheless, PBMs leveraged their negotiating power
and market control at the expense of consumer choice and market transparency.13
See generally Sherwin Rosen, Transaction Costs and Internal Labor Markets,
in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 82–84
(Williamson et al., ed., 1993); RONALD H. COASE, THE NATURE OF THE FIRM (1937).
9 See infra Part V.
10 Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Dir., Office of Policy Planning,
Fed. Trade Comm’s et al. to Senator Richard L. Brown, North Dakota Senate 4
(Mar. 8, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_doc
uments/ftc-staff-comment-honorable-richard-l.brown-concerning-north-dakota
-h.b.1332-regulate-contractual-relationship-between-pharmacy-benefit-manag
ers-and-covered-entities/050311northdakotacomnts.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM
P2-X5MY].
11 THE STATE OF COMPETITION IN THE PHARMACY BENEFITS MANAGER AND
PHARMACY MARKETPLACES: HEARING BEFORE THE H. JUDICIARY SUBCOMM. ON
REGULATORY REFORM, COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW (2016) (statement of
David Balto, private antitrust attorney and antitrust enforcer for the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission), https://docs.house.gov
/meetings/JU/JU05/20151117/104193/HHRG-114-JU05-Wstate-BaltoD-20151
117.pdf [https://perma.cc/88DE-AHYN].
12 Joanna Shepherd, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: The Regulation of
Pharmacy Benefit Managers by a Market Adversary, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1,
2 (2013) (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ISSUES IN DESIGNING A PRESCRIPTION
DRUG BENEFIT FOR MEDICARE 14, 40 tbl. 6 (2002)).
13 See infra Part II.
8
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B.PBM Profit Optimization
PBM business models are built around different pricing
mechanisms.14 “There are three price measures that are important in understanding the payment system for prescription
drugs in the retail pharmacy market: the average manufacturer
price (AMP), the wholesale acquisition cost (WAC), and the average wholesale price (AWP).”15 The AMP is the price paid by
PBMs to either the manufacturer or retail pharmacies that buy
directly from the manufacturers,16 whereas, the WAC denotes
the manufacturer’s price list for sales of a specific drug.17 Lastly,
the AWP is an illustrative pricing list for a drug sold by wholesalers to retail pharmacies or nonretail providers.18 To aid our
understanding of the entire transaction, the Congressional Budget
Office has published the following diagram19:

Meador, supra note 2, at 79.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICING IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR 3 (2007), Pub. No. 2703, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files
/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/01-03-prescriptiondrug.pdf [https://perma.cc
/F3JT-TZX2].
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 5.
14
15
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Before departing from the mechanics of PBM pricing models, it is necessary to address the consequences of spread pricing.
Generally, spread pricing is where PBMs mark up the difference
between the amount they reimburse pharmacies for a drug and the
amount charged to its clients.20 According to Bloomberg, “[s]pread
pricing is a practice that’s most common with generic drugs, which
make up almost 90 percent of all prescriptions dispensed in the
U.S.”21 As a practical matter, PBMs negotiate with manufacturers
using a lower-quoted price, while setting reimbursement rates with
plan sponsors using higher price listings, and therefore entrench
sizable profits.22
In a subsequent Bloomberg study of ninety generic drugs,
“PBMs and pharmacies siphoned off $1.3 billion of the $4.2 billion Medicaid insurers spent on the drugs in 2017.”23 Generally,
Robert Langreth et al., The Secret Drug Pricing System Middlemen Use
to Rake in Millions, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com
/graphics/2018-drug-spread-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/5CJA-2FGA].
21 Id.
22 Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 40.
23 Langreth et al., supra note 20.
20
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the highest markups follow the introduction of new generic drugs.24
Illustrated in the chart below, Ohio’s Medicaid plan providing
for generic versions of the Novartis AG’s leukemia pill, Gleevec,
saw as much as $3,000 in spread pricing fees.25

While the Gleevec spread does not “distinguish between how
much of the [spread] markup is going to the pharmacies and how
much is retained by PBMs,” independent pharmacists claim the
additional revenue is not returned to the pharmacy.26 Furthermore, “four out of five Medicaid managed-care plans” are controlled
by CVS, which contracts with private insurers and “cover[s] roughly
90 percent of the state’s 2.8 million ... Medicaid beneficiaries.”27
In other words, CVS’s statewide control has enabled them
to keep their spread pricing a trade secret.28 According to CVS, “revealing pricing details would keep it from getting the best rates,
and that money it makes on spreads pays for other services the
company provides.”29 However, in response to repeated state
contests concerning CVS’s industry practice, Ohio obtained the
Id.
Id.
26 Langreth et al., supra note 20.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
24
25

296 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:289
spread statistics and determined the hidden fees paid by the
state “amounted to $223.7 million in a 12-month period.”30 Immediately following this report, the Ohio legislature mandated the
managed-care plans to terminate spread pricing contracts for
2019.31 In conclusion, Bloomberg suggests “that PBMs, not pharmacies, have been getting most of the markups on generic drugs
in Ohio.”32 Despite legislative efforts to eliminate spread pricing,
PBMs are still utilizing similar pricing strategies and secretly
exploiting drug costs to their advantage.33
More recently, President Donald Trump signed the Know
the Lowest Price Act and the Patients’ Right to Know Drug Prices
Act.34 While these legislative initiatives will be discussed in Part
III,35 this subsection will briefly discuss their effect on PBMs’
pricing strategies. Specifically, the legislation invalidated PBM
“gag” clauses, which “prevent pharmacists from informing patients
if a prescription would be cheaper if purchased out-of-pocket.”36
For purposes of this section, the legislation is a step in the right
direction as it restores market power to the consumer.37 The
legislation also cuts against the negative externalities of PBM
“take-it-or-leave-it contracts.”38 The legislation rearranges contract incentives and encourages negotiation between pharmacists
and PBMs.39 Nonetheless, these rearrangements are rendered
Id.
Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See Brittany Shoot, Trump Signs 2 Drug Pricing Bills, HHS Secretary
Promises ‘More to Come,’ FORTUNE (Oct. 11, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/10
/11/trump-administration-gag-clause-compare-prescription-prices/ [https://perma
.cc/3P3Y-MH53].
35 See infra Part III.
36 Shoot, supra note 34.
37 Your pharmacist’s hands may be tied when it comes to telling you drug
prices, DIABETES PATIENT ADVOCACY COALITION (May 4, 2018), http://diabetes
pac.org/pbm-gag-clauses-tie-pharmacists-hands/ [https://perma.cc/8YYC-PTGC]
(“When the patient goes to the pharmacy to purchase their prescription medicine, they pay their copay price, believing that they are getting a good deal
through their insurance ... [when] in actuality, they may be better off skipping their insurance and paying the listed price.”).
38 Id. (explaining if “pharmacists refuse[ ] to sign the contract because it
includes a gag order, the PBM will simply take its business to the next pharmacy in town.”).
39 Shoot, supra note 34.
30
31
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useless if PBMs continue to exploit other contract techniques in
negotiations.40
C.Inefficient Bilateral Market Conditions
PBMs negotiating power and in-house pricing schemes have
allowed them to position themselves upon two sides of an intermediate market bilateral oligopoly.41 In simplistic terms, a bilateral
oligopoly “is a market game with two commodities, allowing
strategic behavior on both sides of the market ... [and] when the
number of buyers is large, ... [the] oligopoly[, the PBM,] approximates a game of quantity.”42 In PBM markets, the concentrated
buyers and sellers are not equally equipped to reach bilateral
efficiency.43 Moreover, some economists argue bilateral oligopolies
promote market efficiency because “downstream firms” demand
is met on a reoccurring basis.44 However, this is not the case as
applied to PBMs market negotiations.45 The PBM industry is not
composed of the assumed set of buyer-seller pairs enabled to
negotiate, as Part II will explain its inefficiencies.46
Under ideal market conditions, buyers and sellers are
properly equipped to negotiate and exchange rights under mutually agreeable terms for a specified period of time.47 Presuming
the bilateral nature of PBM contracts, they must “consist[ ] of
mutual promises to do some future act, and the consideration of the
promise of one party is a promise on the part of the other.”48 Part II
will identify concerns, beyond the scope of contract negotiations,
DIABETES PATIENT ADVOCACY COALITION, supra note 37.
Henry Waxman, Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century
Hearings, F.T.C. 1 (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents
/public_comments/2018/08/ftc-2018-0053-d-0016-154973.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C
VH-7W3G].
42 Alex Dickson et al., Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition, 52
ECONOMIC THEORY 979, 979 (2013).
43 Johan Stennek et al., Bilateral oligopoly: WZB Discussion Paper No. FS
IV 01-08, ECONSTOR 1, 3 (2001) (defining bilateral efficiency as a contract which
“maximizes the sum of the two firms’ profits”).
44 Id. at 4.
45 See infra Part II.
46 Id.
47 Stennek et al., supra note 43, at 4.
48 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 8 (2018).
40
41
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regarding PBMs’ industry practices and discuss the need for limited
intervention utilizing the Coase Theorem.
II.RELATED INDUSTRY CONCERNS
A.Formulary Control
In addition to their pricing mechanisms, “PBMs ... amplify
the benefits of rebate concealment and spread profits through the
careful construction of formularies.”49 A formulary is created by
the PBM and enumerates which drugs are covered and their
corresponding co-pay costs.50 This arrangement restructures
incentives and encourages PBMs to provide the drugs that offer
greater yields from rebates and profits.51 As illustrated using
basic economics, “assume drug A costs $50 and the PBM will keep
$5 of the rebate from the manufacturer, while drug B costs $100
and the PBM will keep $6 of the rebate.”52 Consequently, despite
drug A being more cost efficient for the plan sponsor, the PBM
has an incentive to sell drug B in order to optimize rebates contributing to its own profits.53
PBM manipulation of formularies reaches even farther
than rudimentary economics. PBMs have concocted their own
incentive programs to ensure formulary compliance.54 For example, PBMs may pay pharmacists bonus fees whenever they
convince a physician to prescribe a formulary drug.55 Consequently, incentives become even more intertwined and pushed
down the supply chain as some pharmacists might be incentivized to act in their own self-interest. Specifically, a pharmacist
might notify a physician that the drug he or she prescribed is
Meador, supra note 2, at 83.
Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 44.
51 Pharmacy Benefit Mgmt. Inst., Prescription Drug Benefit Cost and Plan
Design Report 20 (2008–09) (on file with author) (explaining the effects of formulary design, and suggesting the mistrust between pharmacies and PBMs make it
easier for PBMs to exploit their financial relationship and possess nearly complete
control of formulary list).
52 Meador, supra note 2, at 83.
53 Id.
54 Andrew S. Krulwich, The Response to Health Care Reform by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 2 (1995).
55 Id.
49
50
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not on the formulary and subsequently convince the physician to
prescribe the formulary drug instead.56 Furthering this line of
logic, drug manufacturers are also incentivized to “have their
products placed on a formulary.”57 As a result, manufacturers are
more inclined to offer generous rebates to a PBM in exchange for
formulary placement or offer the PBM volume discounts when
purchasing certain drugs.58 Therefore, the logic is circular, and
no entity has an incentive to provide oversight of PBM activity.
As a result of PBMs murky dealings and unequal negotiating power, they have control over such formulary lists when
trading with pharmacies.59 Notably, legislation has not attempted
to address this issue.60 As described in Part III, this matter is
best addressed using a market-based approach, provided formularies are determined through a series of negotiations, and cannot
be addressed through aggressive price regulation.61
B.Undercutting Pharmacies: Mail-Order Production
Mail-order pharmacies are controlled by PBMs and promise consumers lower co-pays and convenient service.62 However,
Bruce N. Kuhlik, The FDA’s Regulation of Pharmaceutical Communications in the Context of Managed Care: A Suggested Approach, 50 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 23, 30 (1995).
57 Ruth B. Timm, The Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine and the Pharmaceutical Benefit Management Industry: A Proposed Exception to the Copperweld
Holding, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 309, 318 (1996).
58 Id. (citing Kuhlik, supra note 56, at 31; Robert Marks, Managed Care
Perspectives, MANAGED CARE WK. 3 (Dec. 5, 1994)).
59 Id. at 319–20.
60 Shoot, supra note 34 (Trump’s executive orders address pricing discrimination after the contract has been created).
61 Id.; see generally Marcelle Arak et al., There is a better way to fix our
broken ‘free market’ for drugs than negotiating prices, MARKETWATCH (Jan 31,
2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/there-is-a-better-way-to-fix-our-broken
-free-market-for-drugs-than-negotiating-prices-2017-01-20 [https://perma.cc/D4
LH-K8ST] (explaining why market-based solutions are better suited for negotiating parties).
62 F.T.C., PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF MAIL-ORDER
PHARMACIES (2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports
/pharmacy-benefit-managers-ownership-mail-order-pharmacies-federal-trade
-commission-report/050906pharmbenefitrpt_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FMU-CM3K]
[hereinafter F.T.C., PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS].
56
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mail-order pharmacies merely functioned as another profitproducing utility exploited by PBMs.63 Perhaps even more troubling, mail-order pharmacies enable a PBM to control the supply
of drugs to its own pharmacies, thereby cutting out competitors
and optimizing its profits under higher spreads and rebates from
drug manufacturers.64 Mail-order pharmacies have even gone so
far as to contact doctors and persuade them to switch patients to
an alternative drug which has a higher spread price.65 According
to the FTC, mail-order pharmacies could be manipulated by PBMs
to “increase costs and generate additional profits ….”66 Federal
agencies have not correctly analyzed PBM mail-order pharmacies, and without proper market constraints, it is unclear whether
PBMs are favoring mail-order pharmacies in ways contrary to
the plan sponsor’s interest.67
C.Judicial Challenges to Unfair Trading Practices
It is not a new concept that PBMs are in a dangerous position, as PBMs have been alleged to make illegal attempts to
monopolize in violation of federal antitrust legislation.68 In 2006,
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania consolidated six antitrust
challenges alleging PBMs conspired to fix prices and monopolize
the insurance-covered drug industry.69 The Judicial Panel Multidistrict Litigation found the “actions in th[e] litigation involve
common questions of fact, and that centralization ... will serve
the convenience of the parties ....”70 Specifically, in one of the
consolidated cases, an independent pharmacy alleged the PBMs
See Jeffrey S. Baird, What to Know About Working with PBMs, PHARMACY
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/what-to-know-about
-working-with-pbms [https://perma.cc/T9AX-DTAS].
64 Garret & Garis, supra note 7, at 67 (noting PBMs’ competition-eliminating
activity is at the expense of the consumer because they redirect product to
their own pharmacies, even if the competitor could provide it at a lower cost).
65 Johnson, supra note 3, at 332; see also Meador, supra note 2, at 84.
66 F.T.C., PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS, supra note 62, at i.
67 Id.
68 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2006) (Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits contracting or conspiring in ways that restrict trade).
69 See In re Pharm. Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d. 1352,
1352–54 (J.P.M.L. 2006).
70 Id.
63
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were involved in illegal “parallel behavior.”71 Plaintiffs contend that
“plan sponsors share, and are aware that they share, a common
strategy ... utiliz[ing] a PBM to combine purchasing power and
drive down pharmacy costs.”72 Underpinning the concerns in this
Note, the complaint states the following:
PBMs ... remov[e] the need and existence for any market whereby
they must compete in order to secure the services of pharmacist[s]
to service their insured ... [thus,] removal of this market and conferring of the aggregate power to negotiate these services upon ...
PBMs amounts to horizontal price fixing as it allows for the
stabilization and repression of the fees pharmacists would be
able to charge in a free and open market.73

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,
Northeastern Division, denied the PBMs motion to dismiss and the
case is pending upon grant of Plaintiff’s motion to certify the action
as a class action.74 However, Judge Hopkins noted, “by conspiring
to hold down prices paid to independent pharmacies (among other
alleged actions), PBMs [would] bankrupt those pharmacies, thereby
capturing a larger segment of the insurance-paid prescription
market for the PBMs’ own prescription-dispensing business and
allowing the PBMs to charge higher prices for that service.”75
The court’s conclusions later appeared in the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy Hearing,
regarding antitrust effects on healthcare providers.76 According to
the Committee, “PBMs have substantial monopsony or oligopsony
power and are able to use this power to reduce compensation which
harms the ability of community pharmacies to provide adequate
services.”77 While N. Jackson did not result in direct punitive
N. Jackson Pharm., Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d. 1279,
1284 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (citing SAC Compl. at 53).
72 Id. at 1294.
73 Id.
74 N. Jackson Pharm., Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., Nos. CV-03-2696-VEH,
CV-03-2697-VEH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98774, at *36 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2006).
75 N. Jackson Pharm., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d. at 1292.
76 Antitrust Laws and Their Effects on Health Care Providers, Insurers and
Patients: Hearing before the H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts and Competition
Policy, 111th Cong. 127–28 (2010) (statement of David Balto, Senior Fellow,
Ctr. for Am. Progress Action Fund) [hereinafter Antitrust Laws and Their Effects
on Health Care Providers, Insurers and Patients].
77 Id.
71
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damages, it shed light on the unclear PBM market and coercive
concentration of market power. As discussed above, N. Jackson
triggered the Committee’s recognition of the “critical link” pharmacists have in effective healthcare management.78 However, the
Healthcare Guidelines do not address collaboration by pharmacies,
and consequently raise antitrust obstacles to pharmacists.79 In
fact, the Committee noted the “FTC has approved ... [three] pharmacy joint ventures to provide health care services under the
Guidelines [but] none in the past decade.”80 Consequently,
pharmacists’ unique connection with consumers is untapped and
under-utilized to restore consumer purchasing power.
In addition to these consolidated cases, the patchwork of
various state and federal laws have left the industry to its own
correcting mechanics.81 Part III82 will discuss specific regulatory
initiatives. However, Congress has established anti-kickback
rules, targeted fraudulent PBM activity under the False Claims
Act (FCA), and attempted to apply a liability regime under
ERISA.83 Intertwined with federal initiatives, lies state regulatory attempts to control the PBM market. For example, Kansas
and “[n]umerous other states have passed statutes ... requiring
PBMs to register with the state’s insurance commissioner.”84 Maine
went so far as to mandate that “PBMs are fiduciaries and must act
‘with care, skill, prudence and diligence and in accordance with
the standards of conduct applicable to a fiduciary in an enterprise of like character and with like aims.’”85
These mixed federal and state efforts resulted in frequent
litigation and ultimately produced “slow and inconsistent approaches” to major anticompetitive behavior.86 Accordingly, while
these cases highlight major market deficiencies, at their best,
Antitrust Laws and Their Effects on Health Care Providers, Insurers and
Patients, supra note 76, at 127.
79 Id. (explaining since pharmacies only dispense and do not prescribe,
they are unable to meet the threshold to help providers integrate to help
control utilization).
80 Id.
81 See Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 47.
82 See infra Part III.
83 See Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 51–53.
84 Id. at 59.
85 Id. at 60. (citing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 22, § 2699 (2007)).
86 Id. at 47.
78
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judicial remedies fail to uniformly address underlying market concerns and burden retail pharmacies to pursue costly litigation.87
III.FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES
A.Federal
The Federal government has taken notice of PBMs’ unequal
bargaining power and has invested considerable resources in
addressing market deficiencies.88 Notably, Congress passed the
Medicare Modernization Act, which mandates that the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) analyze the PBM mail-order system.89
However, the FTC’s report found that PBMs’ self-dealing had no
causal connection to higher prices.90 The FTC’s conclusion was
challenged, and critics of the report stated that the Commission
failed to understand the underlying economic issues of the PBM
industry and only analyzed whether plan sponsors were overpaying PBMs.91
The FCA has some bite, as its intention was to target
PBM practices which may be fraudulent.92 In addition, the AntiKickback Act of 1986 (AKA) prevents parties from contracting
for preferential treatment.93 Even under the Medicaid rebate
program, the PBM may be liable if it “overstate[s] the price offered
to it by the manufacturer[, and] the PBM fails to take into account
‘certain payments for benefits provided to PBMs by the pharmaceutical manufacturers ....’”94 Another source of liability is based
Id.
See Peri Iz, Study of Pharmaceutical Benefit Management Industry,
EALTH
CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION 41 (June 2001), https://www.cms
H
.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Re
ports/downloads/cms_2001_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CNB-97KL].
89 Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2174 (2004)
(provision required the FTC study to analyze whether PBMs were engaged in
self-dealing).
90 See F.T.C., PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS, supra note 62, at xi–xiv.
91 See id. at iii–vi (the report had also failed to analyze the effectiveness of
anti-kickback laws).
92 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
93 Anti-Kickback Act of 1986, 41 U.S.C. § 53 (2010).
94 Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 52 (quoting Sheehan, Prescription Drug
Plans, Fraud Schemes, and the False Claims Act, 17 TAXPAYERS AGAINST
FRAUD 18, 21 (1999)).
87
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in the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO) where an Illinois U.S. District Court entertained a multifraud challenge against a PBM.95 In Morse, the employer contracted with a PBM which established a system “whereby the
policyholder’s pharmacy, before releasing the prescription drug
to the policyholder, accesses [the PBMs] system and finds out
whether [the PBM] will provide 100 [percent] of the cost or
whether the policyholder must copay 20 [percent] before receiving
the prescription.”96 In other words, the pharmacy can profit immediately upon the exchange so long as the policyholder is filling
a brand name drug. Additionally, the employer is saving the PBM
money, as it is not responsible for 20 percent of the drug expense.
There, the court determined the employer and its contracted
PBM entered into a scheme to “administer their prescription
drug program in a manner which deprives policyholders of a
benefit to which they are entitled and does so knowingly.”97 In
conclusion, the court denied defendant’s motions and granted
plaintiffs’ petition to proceed as a class action matter.98
Despite occasional judicial enforcement,99 these federal directives are inadequate unless fiduciary duties are applied to PBMs.
Fiduciary responsibilities, as applied to PBMs, have been challenged under ERISA. According to the statute, “a fiduciary shall
discharge his duties with respect to the plan solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries.”100 ERISA defines fiduciary as:
[A] person ... with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority
or control respecting management or disposition of its assets,
(ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other
property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to

Morse v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., No. 99-C-0193, 2000 WL 246245, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2000).
96 Id. at *1.
97 Id. at *3.
98 Id. at *6.
99 See id.
100 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2002).
95
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do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan ....101

PBMs have strongly contested their functions fall outside
ERISA statutory interpretation because any alternative finding
would subject them to a heightened degree of scrutiny.102 The
Supreme Court explained the test for whether an entity is a
fiduciary as one that depends on the entity’s control and authority over the plan.103 Attempts to litigate PBMs as fiduciaries
have been explored by the courts.104 For example, in Caremark,
Inc., the Seventh Circuit denied ERISA liability.105 Specifically,
the Seventh Circuit had to reconcile the following contract provision with that of ERISA’s fiduciary standard: “Caremark will
use its best commercially reasonable efforts to negotiate these
rates with existing pharmacies in [Carpenters’] network.”106
However, even with the provision, Caremark could not negotiate
AWP pricing, nor did the contract contain any mechanism for a
pass-through of any additional savings Caremark managed to
negotiate with retailers.107 Caremark was still “free to negotiate
with retailers to pay less than the amount Carpenters would later
reimburse it, allowing Caremark to pocket the difference.”108
Ultimately, because Caremark’s bargain with the Carpenters was
at arm’s length, Caremark owed no fiduciary duty.109 The court
furthered its analysis and interpreted “commercially reasonable
efforts” to carry little weight as Caremark was still equipped to
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000).
Thomas O’Donnell & Mark Fendler, Prescription or Proscription? The General Failure of Attempts to Litigate and Legislate Against PBMs as “Fiduciaries,”
and the Role of Market Forces Allowing PBMs to Contain Private-Sector Prescription Drug Prices, 40 J. HEALTH L. 205, 205–06 (2007).
103 Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993).
104 See generally Chi. Dist. Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund v. Caremark,
Inc., 474 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2007); Bickley v. Caremark RX, Inc., 461 F.3d 1325
(11th Cir. 2006) Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v.
Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181 (2nd Cir. 2005).
105 Caremark, Inc., 474 F.3d at 477.
106 Id. at 473.
107 Id.
108 Id. (noting that this was the very conduct the plaintiff was alleging as
breach of fiduciary duties).
109 Id. at 474.
101
102
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“negotiate better prices with the retailers than a single client
could negotiate.”110
PBMs have defensively relied on language within their plan
sponsor contracts, which explicitly disclaim fiduciary status.111
Part III will analyze whether PBMs’ contract defense is dispositive
upon the question. However, courts have generally held PBMs’
activity falls short of the “discretionary authority or discretionary
control over the management of the plan because the PBM was
contractually prohibited from unilaterally changing negotiated drug
prices with respect to the plan and was not contractually obligated
to pass along to the plan the savings that the PBM negotiated
with drug retailers.”112 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that “[b]y agreeing to pay a fixed amount to Caremark, Carpenters
forwent its opportunity to garner any additional savings that
Caremark could extract from retailers.”113 There was no provision
in the contract that required specific dealings of rebates, and
without fiduciary duties, there is no nexus to Carpenters’ claim
for savings which the PBM managed to acquire.114
Subjecting PBMs as fiduciaries would protect against controversial business practices, such as concealing spread cost, and
structuring incentives to promote high cost formulary drugs.115
Generally, the PBM would owe duties to plan sponsors and thereby
beneficiaries of private health plans.116 As noted above, state jurisdictions have passed statutes requiring the PBM to operate as a
fiduciary.117 Notwithstanding judicial shortcomings, presuming
PBMs operate as fiduciaries “raises a second issue: are state laws
preempted by ERISA?”118 In re Express Scripts, Inc. PBM Litigation
v. Local 153 Health Fund addressed the preemption issues and
posited “whether the plan had standing to sue under ERISA section
Id.
Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 50–51 (citing Glanton v. ALCOA Prescription Drug Plan, 465 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2005)).
112 Chi. Dist. Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund v. Caremark, Inc., 474
F.3d 467, 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2007).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 470,475–76.
115 See id. at 472, 477.
116 See generally id.
117 Meador, supra note 2, at 95–96.
118 See id. at 101 (citing David Slade, ERISA Preemption and the Question of
Pharmacy Benefit Managers’ Fiduciary Duty, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 409, 411 (2009)).
110
111
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1132 and whether Express Scripts was acting as a plan fiduciary.”119 In In re Express Scripts, “[t]he plaintiff’s only assertion
that might establish fiduciary status was that plaintiff was [functioning as] a trustee.”120 Specifically, In re Express Scripts “considered whether a plan may bring an action for breach of fiduciary
duty if it is not an enumerated party under section 1132(a)(2).”121
The court sidestepped this issue and ruled on procedural grounds
that “subject matter jurisdiction was not proper under ERISA.”122
There, “the Eight Circuit [essentially] decided that a plan generally does not have standing as an entity to bring a cause of
action under ERISA ... [but a]n exception to this rule may exist
when the plan can establish that it is a fiduciary of itself.”123
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
squared 1132(d)—which expressly granted plans a cause of action—
with 1132(a), concluding plans could exercise that right only when
jurisdiction is proper.124 The plaintiff contended it was a trustee
and thus established fiduciary status; however, the court held
this assertion was unsubstantiated.125 The District Court went
on to clarify that fiduciary duty actions could be entertained
when brought by the proper party as a named fiduciary in the
plan documents.126Other courts, particularly the District Court
for the District of Columbia and the First Circuit, had differing
conclusions in similar actions.127 Consequently, litigation efforts
under ERISA “will have to be determined on a circuit-by-circuit
basis” due to the lack of clear and effective market regulation.128
Although a notable procedural hurdle, “in most cases a
plaintiff need not worry about this, because there will be a named
fiduciary in the plan documents.”129 Thus, the named fiduciary
David Slade, Commentary, ERISA Preemption and the Question of Pharmacy Benefits Managers’ Fiduciary Duty, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 409, 415 (2009).
120 Id. at 417.
121 Id. at 416.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 417.
124 See Local 153 Health Fund v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 4:05-MD-016
72-SNL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90470, at *24–25 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 7, 2007).
125 Id. at *27.
126 See id. at *28.
127 See Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. D.C., 605 F. Supp. 2d 77, 87–88 (D.D.C.
2009); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 305 (1st Cir. 2005).
128 Meador, supra note 2, at 103.
129 Slade, supra note 119, at 418.
119
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could “amend the complaint to name a proper plaintiff” via a
plan trustee.130 Upon resolving questions of standing, the courts
are still left with unresolved substantive matters: “whether the
state law claims raised by the plaintiff were preempted and
whether the PBM could be considered a fiduciary under ERISA.”131
Under the Supreme Court holding in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
state laws are preempted, however, the Court omitted “[t]he
question of whether a PBM is a fiduciary.”132
In 2007, the Seventh Circuit did not apply fiduciary standards to a PBM as applied to its negotiation with retailers.133 The
Circuit “reasoned that nothing in the contract between the plan
and the PBM required the PBM to pass ... all savings obtained
through its bargaining.”134 The Seventh Circuit’s holding, in
conjunction with the Eight Circuit’s reasoning in In re Express
Scripts, indicates that a prudent contract between the PBM and
the plan could create fiduciary status.135 Consequently, the current
precedent remains a question of contract interpretation.
Some scholars argue, “subject[ing] a PBM to excessive fiduciary duties would not be fair, as the PBM is a business and
does not exist solely to reduce costs to the plan.”136 This proposition
suggests courts should “consider the existing ERISA provisions in
light of applicable public policy” in order to balance the PBMs selfinterest with its owed duty.137 This argument sets a dangerous
invitation for the courts. Not only would it likely further inconsistent enforcement, but it encourages courts to engage in duties
traditionally reserved to the legislature.138 At best, courts are
left to judicial precedent as applied to “cases involving managed
care organizations (MCOs) ... [which] favor[s] an MCO’s freedom
to reduce health care costs by making determinations about how
Id.
Id.
132 Id.; see also Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208–09 (2004) (holding that “[t]he purpose of ERISA is provide uniform regulatory regime [regarding]
employee benefit plans.”).
133 See Chi. Dist. Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund v. Caremark, Inc.,
474 F.3d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 2007).
134 Slade, supra note 119, at 419–20.
135 See id. at 420.
136 Id. at 423.
137 Id. at 424.
138 See id.
130
131
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much, and what kind of, care should be provided.”139 Without
statutory framework, the courts are not yet equipped to assert
authority in efforts to correct an unaccountable industry.140
B.State
Various state agencies have also made attempts to regulate
PBMs, including, “boards of pharmacy, state insurance commissioners, and state Medicaid agencies.”141 These agencies are often
limited in jurisdictional scope and have thus been ineffective in
addressing the macroeconomic concerns raised herein. Although,
legislatures have made direct attempts to regulate PBMs.142 For
example, the District of Columbia passed a law requiring “[A PBM
to act as] a fiduciary[,] ... [p]erform its duties with care, skill, prudence, and diligence[,] ... notify the covered entity ... of any activity,
policy or practice ... that directly or indirectly presents any conflict of interest[,]” and require various disclosures upon request
of a covered entity.143 While research regarding these laws effectiveness is limited, “in South Dakota ... well over $800,000 was
saved in state health insurance costs in a single year as the direct
result of the more transparent business model” akin to Maine’s
and the District of Columbia’s regulation.144 These legislative
efforts are effective as they reveal PBMs’ pricing strategies and
require a heightened degree of protection to plan sponsors.145
Nonetheless, as this Note will conclude, these solutions can be
broadened naturally upon restoring transparent negotiations and
consumer choice. Without these market considerations in mind,
similar state legislative action alone will incentivize forum shopping and cause health plans to transfer their suits to jurisdictions with favorable legislation.146
As mentioned in Section I.B, President Trump’s executive
orders are not effective, and substantively been enforced by states
Id.
See id. at 424–25.
141 Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 55.
142 See id. at 59–61.
143 D.C. CODE § 48-832.01 (Westlaw 2019).
144 Prescription Policy Choices, PBM Fiduciary Duty and Transparency
(2005), https://fliphtml5.com/gzdm/qltz [https://perma.cc/T75G-3U3C].
145 See Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 58, 76.
146 See id. at 73–74.
139
140
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prior to October 2018.147 According to the National Conference of
State Legislation, thirty-three states enacted laws prohibiting
PBM “gag clauses” as of May 2019.148 Additionally, some states
have mandated transparency in their efforts to reduce rising drug
cost.149 Specifically, South Dakota’s statute mandates PBMs to
release rebate information and enforce audit rights.150 Although
states are better suited for experimental legislation, inconsistent
approaches are not conducive to addressing market deficiencies
and produce costly state litigation.151
The Virginia legislature has been proactive in its attempts
to regulate PBMs commercial activity.152 As early as 2015, Virginia
required “contracts between health insurance carriers and their
intermediaries to contain provisions that allow the parties to update every seven days the maximum allowable cost list.”153 In
addition, the 2015 legislation protects the participating pharmacy
from PBM retaliation should it invoke its rights under any contractual provision.154 Neighboring jurisdictions, such as Maryland,
have also been active in attempts to promulgate legislation authorizing the State Insurance Commissioner to require specific
disclosures from PBMs, and “provides that a [contract] provision
prohibiting reimbursements of a certain amount does not apply
to reimbursements for certain drugs or to chain pharmacies.”155
Maryland’s legislation goes so far as to regulating “how PBMs ...
negotiate their contracts with pharmacies, including what must be
disclosed as well as the timing for specific actions like audits.”156
Maryland’s legislative initiatives are unique in that they
achieve regulation through means of negotiation and disclosure
Colleen Becker, States Regulating Pharmaceutical Benefit Managers, NACONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 11, 2018), http://www.ncsl
.org/research/health/pbm-state-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/JKV5-7GZC].
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-29E-4 (2007); see § 58-29E-7.
151 See Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 47.
152 See PBM WATCH, Pharmacy Benefit Manager Legislation, http://www
.pbmwatch.com/pbm-legislation.html [https://perma.cc/68PD-L8SU].
153 Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407.15:2 (2015).
154 See id. § 38.2-3407.15:2(B).
155 PBM WATCH, supra note 152; see also MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-1642 (2018).
156 PBM WATCH, supra note 152; see generally MD. CODE ANN., INSURANCE
§ 15-1601 (2018).
147
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requirements, rather than mandatory pricing review.157 Specifically, § 15-1601(k) directly addresses Pharmacy and Therapeutics
Committees (P&T) as “a committee established by a [PBM] to:
(1) objectively appraise and evaluate prescription drugs; and (2)
make recommendations to a purchaser regarding the selection of
drugs for the purchaser’s formulary.”158 The use of P&T’s is commonly used in private industry.159 For example, Blue Shield of
California’s P&T is “made up of independent community physicians
and pharmacists, who are not Blue Shield of California employees.”160 Similar to concepts of corporate law, P&Ts attempted to
remove bias and presented an opportunity for state intervention
while balancing efficient market considerations.161 Nonetheless,
P&Ts are not being utilized as its members often lack an understanding of “health care system contracts and reimbursement
strategies.”162 In other words, P&Ts must uniformly consider
“pharmacy’s role in the total episode of care and the impact of
pharmaceuticals on value-based reimbursement strategies”163 in
response to furthering “total clinical outcomes in designing costeffective formularies.”164
While the effects of these state initiatives are difficult to
measure, the Virginia legislature has continued to enforce principles of market transparency and PBM regulation.165 Virginia
Senator Dunnavant and Delegate Pillion introduced budget
amendments aimed to increase PBM accountability, ensure state
oversight of Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (MCOs), and
See PBM WATCH, supra note 152.
§ 15-1601(k).
159 See Linda S. Tyler et al., ASHP Guidelines on the Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee and the Formulary System, 65 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY
1272, 1273 (2008).
160 BLUE SHIELD OF CALIFORNIA: PHARMACY AND THERAPEUTICS COMMITTEE,
What is the Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee?, https://www.blueshieldca
.com/bsca/pharmacy/faqs/pharmacy-therapeutics-committee.sp [https://perma
.cc/J8X4-3R2P].
161 Tyler et al., supra note 159, at 1273–74.
162 David Shulkin, Reinventing the Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee,
37 PHARMACY THERAPEUTICS 623, 624 (2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC3498992/ [https://perma.cc/FTA4-KJRG].
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 See generally Memorandum from the American Pharmacists Association to the VCU School of Pharmacy (Jan. 25, 2019) (on file with author).
157
158
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mandate that pharmacies are fairly reimbursed.166 According to
the American Pharmacists Association, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and North Carolina, state programs have the authority
to ensure reasonable contract terms between MCOs, PBMs, and
community pharmacies.167 Specifically, the contract terms enable
states to track expenditures of its tax dollars because they establish reimbursement rates for pharmacy services under the feefor-service program.168
While Virginia’s legislative proposals do not go so far as to
require contract provisions, they are aimed at protecting consumer
choice of pharmacy providers and requiring fair treatment of
community retail pharmacies.169 For example, Virginia H.B. 2223
“allow[s] a covered individual to fill their prescription at any
mail order or networking participating retail pharmacy if the
retail pharmacy agrees to a comparable price to the mail order.”170 The Bill also prohibits PBMs from charging differential
co-payment or additional fees for a covered individual that
chooses to fill their prescription at an in-network retail pharmacy instead of the mail order pharmacy.171 In accordance with the
premise behind this Note, H.B. 2223 aims at restoring consumer
choice to best regulate the market through state regulation of
transparent transactions.
Critics of Virginia H.B. 2223 posit the bill undercuts lawmakers’ duty to “preserve the right of private contract.”172 Critics argue enabling “government overreach would restrict some of
the practices and tools PBMs use to reach optimal deals, potentially resulting in higher insurance premiums.”173 Adversaries of
See id.
Id.
168 Id.
169 See id.
170 Id.; see also H.B. 2223, 2019 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019) (a bill
to amend and reenact § 54.1-3420.2 of the Code of Virginia and to amend the
Code of Virginia by adding a section numbered 38.2-3407.15:5, relating to
pharmacy services; mail order and delivery; pharmacy benefit managers).
171 Memorandum from the American Pharmacists Association to the VCU
School of Pharmacy (Jan. 25, 2019) (on file with author).
172 Americans for Tax Reform, HB2223 Could Result in Higher Insurance
Rates for Medicines (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.atr.org/hb2223-could-result-higher
-insurance-rates-medicines [https://perma.cc/F66J-X2CQ].
173 Id.
166
167
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H.B. 2223 counter, claiming “[t]he best way to lower the price of
healthcare is to embrace free market solutions, which allow for
competition that improves quality, increases the number of
choices available, and naturally lowers prices.”174
Although the H.B. 2223 critics are correct in some of their
general conclusions, they wrongly identify issues and falsely believe
government intervention and free market principles are mutually
exclusive. Provided the PBM market is operating under manipulated incentives and inequitable bargaining powers, further removal
of oversight will only lessen marketplace competition. Without
the proper market infrastructure, as instituted through targeted
government intervention, PBMs will operate under the smoke
screen of free market protections while exploiting its unilateral
bargaining power.
Ultimately, Virginia was reluctant to involve itself with the
PBM market and H.B. 2223 failed the requisite vote to pass the
Senate.175 In the wake of Virginia’s recent rejection of market
oversight, retail pharmacies continue to face impracticable market pressures under a regime of pricing instruments designed to
punish customers that elect to fill a prescription via in-network
retail community pharmacy.176 Moreover, as discussed in Section
II.C, contract disputes will continue to be litigated and further
produce inconsistent standards and PBM forum shopping.
IV.MARKET SOLUTIONS
As a result of inconsistent state legislative approaches,
and under a federal regime hesitant to consider comprehensive
legislation, this Note posits private industry mechanics and
market-based approaches will produce optimal consumer conditions. These approaches are grounded in contract to “give health
plan managers guidance regarding the tools they need to equip
themselves to negotiate more effectively with PBMs.”177 According
to fundamental Coasean economics:
Id.
See Virginia Legislative Services: H.B 2223 Pharmacies; delivery of
prescription drugs, pharmacy benefit managers (Feb. 14, 2019) (Senate Subcommittee of Education and Health passed indefinitely).
176 See Memorandum from the American Pharmacists Association to the
VCU School of Pharmacy (January 25, 2019) (on file with author).
177 Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 78.
174
175
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Direct government regulation will not necessarily give better
results than leaving the problem to be solved by the market or
the firm. But equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such
governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an
improvement in economic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely when, as is normally the case with the smoke nuisance, a large number of people are involved, and in which
therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market
or the firm may be high.178

These economic concepts are applicable to government allocation just as they are to market resources.179 Similar to the
political market, PBMs face lower transaction costs and are
equipped for coercive bargaining, while pharmacies and consumers
face higher transaction costs and thereby are disincentivized from
market negotiations.180 As illustrated in Parts I and II, costs are
imposed on those in the high-transaction-cost group, who cannot
bargain to mitigate them.181 Applied in this Note, “[t]he Coase
theorem implies that resources are being allocated efficiently if
constraints are taken as given but also implies that resources
could be allocated more efficiently if constraints can be modified
to lower transaction costs by changing institutions.”182 Moreover,
Coase’s solution in “The Problem of Social Cost” requires government intervention to allocate resources and enforce market
optimization.183 Academics believe, “if government does the job
properly of pricing the externalities—neither society nor business
need suffer under a regulatory regime compared to the theoretical optimal outcome.”184
John Cassidy, Ronald Coase and the Misuse of Economics, NEW YORKER
(Sept. 3, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/ronald-coase-and
-the-misuse-of-economics [https://perma.cc/T5XU-8AAY].
179 See Randall G. Holcombe, The Coase Theorem, Applied to Markets and
Government, 23 INDEP. REV. 249, 250–52 (2018).
180 Id. at 252.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 256–57 (citing Francesco Parisi, Political Coase Theorem, 115 PUBLIC
CHOICE 1-2: 1-36 (2003)).
183 See Clapton Munongerwa, Coase Theorem: Is there need for Government
Intervention? 3–4, https://www.slideshare.net/claptonmunongerwa/coasian-ar
guments [https://perma.cc/2DPB-E2NC] (explaining when government intervention is necessary under Coase economic assumptions).
184 Eric Schnurer, A Map for Making Government Useful 3, U.S. NEWS
(Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/eric-schnurer/2013/09
178
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According to a U.S. News report, “the prescription drug
debate in recent years ... centered on using government not to
mandate that drug manufacturers cut prices, but to aggregate
consumer purchasing to drive prices down.”185 In conclusion,
regulation can be productive if its regulatory bodies conceive
healthcare initiatives within the same economic considerations
as businesses.186 Targeted government regulation is necessary to
internalize externalities, and thereby restore efficient market
structures and negotiations to PBMs transactions and contribute
to lower drug costs.187
A.Free-Market Myth and Private Industry Concerns
The common myth that the pharmaceutical industry is free
because its prices are not regulated is flawed in its reasoning. As
articulated in the subsequent discussion, aggressive federal regulation is a culprit of high prescription drug cost.188
1.Artificial Monopolies, Innovative Drugs, and “Off-Patent
Drugs”189
The Constitution has long recognized the importance of
rewarding, incentivizing, and protecting innovation through the
use of patents.190 As applied to pharmaceuticals, these protections are especially necessary presuming the high costs and risks
of drug development.191 “But monopolies are not markets, especially
/04/ronald-coase-and-how-government-can-operate-like-corporations [https://
perma.cc/HU8H-WSS2].
185 Id.
186 Id.; see Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 78.
187 Schnurer, supra note 184, at 3.
188 See generally Avik S. A. Roy, The Competition Prescription: A MarketBased Plan for Making Innovative Medicines Affordable, THE FOUND. FOR
RESEARCH ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2017), https://freopp.docsend.com/view/cf
aqar8 [https://perma.cc/F7L6-8YBF].
189 Id. (article discusses an unusual class of drugs which patents have expired, yet federal regulation continues to freeze competition and effectively raise
drug costs for plan sponsors and consumers).
190 See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Karl B. Lutz, Patents and
Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 32 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 83, 86–87 (1950).
191 Roy, supra note 188, at 10.
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in the dozens of disease areas where therapeutic alternatives are
not available.”192 Despite sunset provisions to certain patents,
“[t]here are a number of old drugs whose patents have long expired for which prices are unusually high, because unwise [ ]
FDA regulations effectively guarantee monopolies and prohibit
competition.”193 Specifically, four categories of off-patent drugs
have been the target of price inflation: (1) drugs used to treat rare
disease; (2) preexisting drugs that were marketed before the FDA’s
inception; (3) drugs delivered using specialized devices; and (4)
drugs associated with significant health and/or safety issues.194
For purposes of this Note, analysis into the complex grants
of off-patent or orphan drugs is unnecessary. Essentially, the federal government has manufactured competitive barriers to entry
as many manufacturers have manipulated the federal regulations to insulate themselves from competition.195
This begs the question: are there available remedies vested
in existing antitrust regulations? The answer is limited, as “insurers are prevented by federal and state antitrust laws from
jointly negotiating reimbursement rates for innovative drugs
[within] [ ] a given region.”196 Therefore, federal regulations, as
applied to innovative drugs, secure monopolies to drug manufacturers, while simultaneously prohibiting insurers from collectively
negotiating with its suppliers.197
Eliminating market barriers to promote competition and
lower consumer costs is not radical and has been effective in comparative industries.198 While subsequent sections will expound
upon market-based solutions, it is worthy to discuss the restructuring of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDA Act”).199 The
FDA Act was designed to expedite drug products to life-threatening
medical demand.200 Avik Roy, President of the Foundation for
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
194 Id. at 11.
195 Id. at 13–14.
196 Id. at 15.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 15–16 (explaining how price competition has controlled Apple’s
manipulation of the information-technology market, contributing to higher
quality products within reasonable consumer price expectations).
199 See id. at 14–17; see generally FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C.
§ 301 (2018).
200 21 U.S.C. § 301.
192
193
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Research on Equal Opportunity, suggests Congress could amend
the FDA Act to expand its expedited provision “to drugs being
developed for diseases where only one or two FDA-approved
drugs can be considered to represent the standard of care.”201
According to Roy, restructuring the FDA Act would “advance the
public’s interest in mitigating the adverse impact of monopolies
and duopolies.”202 Notwithstanding Roy’s competition-based
approach, the underlying problem persists, that is, patients’ lack
of control over assets expended on their behalf, and prevailing
opaque market conditions.203
2.PCMA’s Market-Based Solution
The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
arranged hearings examining “methods and reasoning behind
recent drug price increases.”204 Responding to these concerns,
Mark Merritt, President and CEO of the Pharmaceutical Care
Management Association (PCMA), “outlined market-based policy
solutions to help increase competition and lower prescription drug
costs.”205 While this Note approaches Merritt’s statements with
skepticism, he correctly articulated “[t]he pricing tactics discussed
today are just one piece of a much larger puzzle.”206 Specifically,
Merritt outlined the following as viable market-based solutions: (1)
accelerating FDA approvals of me-too drug brands against drugs
facing no competition; (2) accelerating FDA approval of generics to
compete with off-patent brands facing no competition; (3) generate
a government “watch list” of all off-patent brands, thereby putting
acquirers on alert that policymakers can monitor these situations;
Roy, supra note 188, at 17.
Id.
203 Id.
204 Press Release, PCMA, PBMs Provide Policy Solutions to Increase Competition, Reduce Rx Costs (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.pcmanet.org/pbms-provide
-policy-solutions-to-increase-competition-reduce-rx-costs/ [https://perma.cc/V32R
-5AE6] [hereinafter Press Release, PCMA]; see also Developments in the Prescription Drug Market: Hearing Before the House Committee on Oversight and
Gov’t Reform, 2154 RHOB 114th Cong. 1 (2016), https://docs.house.gov/Com
mittee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=104374 [https://perma.cc/6RF5-8TXA].
205 Press Release, PCMA, supra note 204, at 1.
206 Id. (PARA what pricing tactics were discussed and implications of his
statements); see also Developments in the Prescription Drug Market: Hearing Before the House Committee on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, supra note 204, at 7–8.
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and (4) mandating co-pay coupons as illegal kickbacks for all
insurance companies that receive federal subsidy.207
In theory, the PCMA’s argument purports to increase
competition through broader consumer choice.208 However, it fails to
address market transparency.209 This is likely due to PBMs fear
of transparency litigation. In fact, “[t]he PBM industry argues that
legislation mandating disclosure will harm the PBM industry
and reduce the discounts that the PBMs are able to negotiate on
behalf of health plans.”210 Former policy director for the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), David Balto, responded to PCMA’s
transparency concerns, calling them “inconsistent with economic
theory, antitrust law and common sense.”211 Consequently, PCMA’s
argument falls short of its purported market-based solution. Under
this proposal, PBMs would still be encouraged to weaponize pricing strategies, reap benefits from spread pricing, and ultimately,
consumers would remain uninformed and powerless.212
B.Transparent Markets and Contracting Tenants
Market transparency has long been a concern of regulatory
agencies. According to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC),
transparency “plays a fundamental role in the fairness and efficiency of the secondary markets” and “transparency [helps] to
link dispersed markets and improves the price discovery, fairness, competitiveness and attractiveness of U.S. markets.”213 As
applied to PBMs, its market power is derived from streams of
market share but also “from the paucity of information available
to those who deal with the PBMs.”214 Naturally, transparency
contributes to efficient dealings and discourages controversial
industry practices.215
Press Release, PCMA, supra note 204, at 2.
Id. at 1.
209 Id.
210 Garett & Garis, supra note 7, at 61.
211 Id. at 62–63 (citing Rob Eder, Nothing More ‘transparent’ than PBM
Posturing—Prescription Benefit Management, DRUG STORE NEWS (Sept. 22, 2003)).
212 Id. at 61.
213 SEC Market 2000 Study, Chapter IV-1 (Jan. 1994).
214 Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 63 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 377–78 (1977) (noting restrictions on pricing transparency “increases
the difficulty of discovering the lowest cost seller”)).
215 See SEC Market 2000 Study, supra note 213, at Chapter IV-1.
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For example, attorneys general from twenty states settled
claims under deceptive trade practices actions against Medco
Health Solutions, Inc.216 According to the New York Attorney
General, “[t]his case show[ed] how [PBMs] previously hid from
consumers, doctors and health plans that they were switching
prescriptions to promote their own profits.”217 Garrett & Garis
articulate that these practices are readily prevented when negotiating parties are equipped with transparent negotiating power
backed by statutory enforcement.218 Furthermore, Garrett’s article
posits a plausible market-based solution, utilizing nonprofit pass
through PBMs that provide complete transparency to plans.219
According to Garrett’s nonprofit concept, setting up the
“PBM could be [done] through a joint venture arrangement among
the plans, the system could be licensed, or the plans could simply
pay a processing fee calculated on a per-covered life or pertransaction basis.”220 These independent, or transparent PBMs,
pledge to conduct business in accordance with a set of guiding
principles by the NCPA that align the interests of patients, employers, and community pharmacies.221 Ideally, these entities
would focus on formulary management.222 According to Bestie’s
Employee Benefit Review, “transparent model PBMs focus on
evidence-based formulary development, objective clinical review,
and lowest net costs.”223 Some transparent PBM models even open
its committee meetings to clients, and make available all minutes
for client review.224 Bestie concludes, under transparent PBMs
models, “the results are clearly visible, and clients can feel very
Press Release, New York Attorney General, 19 States Settle Deceptive
Trade Practices Claims Against Medco Health Solutions (Apr. 26, 2004).
217 Id.
218 Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 65, 72–73.
219 Id. at 72, 74.
220 Id. at 74.
221 National Community Pharmacists Association, Transparent PBM Listing,
https://www.ncpanet.org/pdf/Independent-Transparent-PBMs-Listing.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9GZW-F2QJ].
222 Navitus, Employee Benefit Plan Review, https://m.navitus.com/getattach
ment/7262cce1-fbea-4ab3-9ef2-c4d0f4838c86/The-Transparent-PBM-Pass-Through
-Model-Managing-Dr.aspx [https://perma.cc/DC73-TZQ6].
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224 Id.
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comfortable in a pay-for-performance setting.”225 Furthermore,
because transparent PBM incentives are aligned with that of its
clients, retained discounts are passed directly back to its clients.226
However, even a transparent PBM may not disclose all of its contracts nor eliminate self-serving incentives.227 Therefore, statutes
should encourage transparent entity formation while enforcing
fiduciary duties in negotiation efforts.
Standardized contracting has also been suggested to reduce
transactional costs and empower consumer choice.228 Standardized contracts mitigate administrative obstacles associated with
collaborative health plans negotiating with a large number of
sponsors.229 Thus, subject to the limitations in Part V, these
contracts would shorten the negotiation process, increase parties’
familiarity with contract terms, restrict room for deviation, and
aid in establishing a uniform body of common law.
C.Role of Pharmacists
Pharmacists play a significant role within any healthcare
regime. The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Competition suggests pharmacists critical nexus to effective management
“result[s] [from their] face-to-face service and personal relationships” which enable them to “help patients manage lifestyle choices,
[and] monitor and improve drug adherence.”230 Under this Note’s
market-based approach, in conjunction with federal gag-clause
prohibition, pharmacists can empower consumers and send signals
Id.
Id.
227 Id. (explaining even a PBM which guarantees 80 percent of rebates returned while retaining 20 percent will still be inclined to maximize its 20
percent earning potential).
228 Garret & Garis, supra note 7, at 74.
229 Id. at 74–75 (explaining Rx Collaborative which was run by Towers
Perrin, contracted with 50 Fortune 500 companies that all insisted on completed
disclosure of revenue sources and negotiating pricing with manufactures.
Because the contracts were not standardized, this approach was infeasible
given the unusually high transactional and informational costs associated with
company requests).
230 Antitrust Laws and Their Effect on Healthcare Providers, Insurers and
Patients: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Competition Policy of
the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 157 (2010).
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to the market via product choice.231 Community pharmacies rely on
transparent information exchanges, which “provid[es] them [with]
the important groundwork to have access to patients medical
records which will help them coordinate care with other providers.”232 However, unlike some community pharmacies, pharmacists
are not charged with the duty to negotiate with customers and
provide cheaper drug alternatives.233 In other words, the federal
executive orders that grant pharmacists the ability to fully inform
customer choice, do not place the onus on pharmacist for every
transaction.234 Consequently, pharmacists’ unique nexus to consumer choice continues to be under-utilized and dilutes the effect
of legislative initiatives.235
V.CONTRACT AND MARKET MORALITY
Collectively applying these considerations, it’s important
to revisit the instrument at the apex of all PBM market debates.
That is, the contract between plan sponsors and PBMs contracted
pharmacies. Examining these contracts, and their formation, is
critical as contract law’s purpose has been linked to supporting
robust markets.236 Moreover, Professor Nathan Oman, William &
Mary Law Professor and Co-Chair of the Center for the Study of
Law and Markets, suggests even agreements not connected to
well-functioning markets should be enforced, if only to develop
new well-functioning markets.237 Oman’s approach to boilerplate
contracts, while correctly focused on market behavior, should not be
applied to the PBM market until some degree of correction occurs.
Despite Oman’s well-reasoned support of boilerplate or
standardized contracts, when applied to the current PBM market,
the logic conflicts. The use of these contracts in murky, abused,
Id. at 128.
Id.
233 DIABETES PATIENT ADVOCACY COALITION, supra note 37.
234 See Linette Lopez, Trump just sold us all out on drug pricing, BUSINESS
INSIDER (June 21, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-drug-pric
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and opaque markets is far more costly than the implied fear of
transaction costs when obtaining consent.238 Similar to the fiduciary context of an expert and lay person, PBMs are sophisticated
and enter contract negotiations with unmatched negotiating
power.239 Accordingly, while I agree with Oman’s thesis, the PBM
industry must first become educated regarding the complex exchanges through transparency legislation, coupled with increased
competition, compulsory pharmacist interaction, independent pass
through entities, and sufficient negotiation structures. Upon balancing these interests, the PBM market will become vested with the
necessary prerequisites for efficient laissez-faire exchanges, aimed
to reach the economically desired outcome. Once achieved, Oman’s
argument should then be applied to boilerplate contracts to lower
transaction costs and support the new well-functioning market.
In summation, contract law, under the proper conditions, is correlated with positive cultivation of transparency values.
CONCLUSION
Until recently, PBMs have evaded examination because
most consumers are unaware of their existence and fail to understand the complex transactional process.240 While there still
rests a heavy educational burden upon PBM market players, one
thing remains, mere legislative efforts, without market considerations, are insufficient to correcting the imbalance. The PBM market remains a small piece within the larger healthcare industry.241
However, PBM market regulation is functionally necessary when
addressing prescription drug costs. Legislative efforts continue
to fall short of effective business-reasoned policy and undermine
the markets ability to facilitate efficient results when under
corrected incentives.242 Competition within the PBM market,
underpinned through the discussed transparency solutions, will
lower drug costs and restore consumer purchasing power without clouding the market with burdensome legislation.
Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 61.
Johnson, supra note 3, at 328.
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